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| The Structure of Scientific Revolutions | 
 enlarge | Author: Thomas S. Kuhn
Publisher: University Of Chicago Press
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Customer Ratings:  121 comments
Media: Paperback
Edition: 1
Number Of Items: 1
Pages: 226
Shipping Weight (pounds): 0.5
Dimensions (inch): 7.9 x 5.2 x 0.6
ISBN: 0226458083
Dewey Decimal Number: 501
EAN: 9780226458083
Publication Date: December 15, 1996
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 A timeless classic! July 9, 2007
0 out of 2 found this comment useful.
Although written in 1962, this book is as valid now as ever, perhaps more so. Right now we are witnessing a paradigm shift. Move over Big Bang, Dark Matter, Dark Energy, and mathematical anbstraction in general, and say hello to Plasma Cosmology and The Electric Universe!
 Is this book proof that the world has gone mad? June 5, 2007
19 out of 32 found this comment useful.
Iconic? Absolutely. Influential? Undoubtedly. The source of an incredible amount of philosophical error and mischief? Yes - perhaps more so than any other book of the 20th century. Was this despite its many errors? I doubt it. I think it was precisely BECAUSE of its many errors it became so popular. But to explain...
The primary implication of "The Structure of Scientific Revolutions" is that science has no, and should be granted no, privileged standing amongst competing methods of ascertaining reality. It claims that knowledge is "created" merely by "assent" (not *discovered*), and likens the replacement of one theory with another - like Newtonian physics with Einsteinian - to "religious conversion" (an act regard by most critical thinkers as the example par excellence of irrationality).
That being the case, it is no wonder that the book should have become so popular amongst members of the softer sciences, like sociology, philosophy, political science, history, etc., as well as amongst the clearly insane, like astrologers, religious lunatics, and palm readers. To quote Kuhn himself, "as in political revolutions, so in paradigm choice - there is no standard higher than the assent of the relevant community". Well, of course not, once it has been adopted as a premise that nothing about the world-in-itself can ever be known. All "facts", in that case, only become a matter of *what "relevant" people decide are, or should be, the "facts" (it is no wonder that Steve Fuller has been able to make the case for Kuhn as a Platonic [in the worst way] elitist. See Fuller's "Kuhn vs. Popper" or his "Thomas Kuhn: A Philosophical History For Our Times").
Kuhn also argues that the idea that there has been an accumulation of objective knowledge about the world is a myth. I can only hope that those readers who may have noticed the existence of electricity, cell phones, air flight, radios, immunizations, and about three billion other discoveries and inventions over the past few hundred years, will regard Kuhn's claims as as ludicrous as they deserve to be regarded.
For an unsparing (and frequently hilarious) critique of Kuhn's philosophy (and that of Popper, Feyerabend, and Lakatos), I strongly recommend "Scientific Irrationalism: Origins of a Post-Modern Cult", by the late University of Sydney philosopher David Stove.
I hope this review has been of benefit to someone.
Good luck in your studies.
Brilliant - A Classic December 23, 2006
8 out of 9 found this comment useful.
Originally published in 1962 Thomas Kuhn's `The Structure of Scientific Revolutions' is widely recognized as the most influential work in the philosophy of science. It is one of those rare scientific works/commentaries that has had enduring significance outside of its specific field.
At the time of Kuhn's writing scientific progress was widely viewed an evolutionary process characterized by the gradual accumulation of knowledge and corresponding theoretical refinement. In opposition to this view, Kuhn proposed a more discontinuous or revolutionary view - one where scientific understanding undergoes periodic abrupt and radical change or paradigm shifts. In a simple Kuhnian view, paradigms can be understood as collections of shared assumptions and beliefs within scientific communities that serve to guide and interpret research. In this framework so-called `normal' science (refinement) occurs within given paradigms. Occasionally, normal science encounters sufficient anomalies or difficulties that the prevailing worldview is challenged. This challenge is often characterized, at first, by ad hoc theoretical adjustments to account for these difficulties and, in the certain circumstances eventually to the adoption of a new explanatory paradigm. A classic example of such transitions is the oft cited transitions in physics from Aristotelian to Newtonian to Relativity. Throughout the text Kuhn provides a vast number of well known as lesser known examples of paradigm shifts.
As with all meta-theories the applicability of Kuhn's model can be, and sometimes has been, overstated. That said, it is a wonderful explanatory tool in science as well as the broader socio-psychological context - we see what we believe. An interesting contemporary example of Kuhn's theory can be seen in Neo-Darwinian Theory (NDT). Although Darwinism still has outspoken supporters, from a Kuhnian perspective it could be viewed as bumping -up against the boundary of normal science. That is to say that it is encountering an increasing number of difficulties, which has triggered an accompanying growth in ad hoc adjustments. Despite its many shortcomings, however, NDT has not been replaced as a paradigm. This is not surprising in the Kuhnian view; theories in crisis tend to stick around until there is an alternative. In the case of NDT; though critics such as the Intelligent Design (ID) movement have highlighted Darwinism's deficiencies, they have not to date put forward a broadly appealing alternative.
Overall, one of those rare works that has developed an influence well beyond its' intended audience. I recommend it highly to all students of science and philosophy - it is a true classic. For an opposing view a look at some work by Popper may be instructive.
Small and perfectly formed: one of the greats of 20th Century Philosophy December 16, 2006
15 out of 18 found this comment useful.
A true classic of twentieth century literature, this wonderful little book, which argues for the contingency of scientific knowledge, deserves space on the bookshelf next to The Wealth of Nations (identifying the contingency of economic wellbeing and value), Hume's A Treatise of Human Nature (causal scepticism), The Origin of Species (the contingency of biological development) and Contingency, Irony and Solidarity (the contingency of language) - along with those perennially confusing continental stalwarts Freddie Nietzsche and Ludwig Wittgenstein, as representing the fundamental underpinnings of modern Relativist thought.
Thanks to the Chomskies, Dawkinses and Sokals of this world, who have cunningly bound perfectly sensible Cognitive and Ethical Relativism to silly Post-Structuralism, proper Relativism has become a dirty word these days.
It may be unfashionable but it's also powerful, and if you want to understand it, and its power, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions - as short and beautifully written a classic of philosophy as you could possibly ask for - is as good a place as any to start.
Following publication of "Structure", Kuhn had a famous public debate with Karl Popper over what counts as science and the way in which science develops over time. Popper had, in The Logic of Scientific Discovery, made the invaluable observation that "verification" as a standard for science is too high, since as a matter of logic an argument based on induction ("since the sun has risen on every day in recorded history, therefore it will rise tomorrow") can never be proven true. The sun rising is a very good example: for all our folksy expectations, current cosmology predicts that there will be a point at some time in the distant future when the sun will explode, and therefore will not rise tomorrow.
In lieu of verification as the scientific gold standard, Popper asserted (seemingly plausibly) that valid scientific theory could be assessed by the lack of any falsifying evidence among the data. The requirement for scientific statements to be "falsifiable" is a useful contribution to the debate: To be of any use, a scientific theory must narrow down from the list of all possible outcomes a set of predicted ones, and rule the rest out. Statements which cannot be falsified by any conceivable evidence don't do that, so fail at science's fundamental task.
Thomas Kuhn's insight was to offer a historian's perspective, and to note that, while that might be theory, that's simply not what science does in practice. Scientific theories are absolutely never thrown out the moment contradictory evidence is observed: the dial is tapped, the experiment re-run, and "numerous articulations and ad hoc modifications of their theory" are devised to eliminate any apparent conflict. Indeed, when the data won't do what it's meant to, sometimes it is the question which is rejected as being irrelevant, and not the answer predicted by the theory.
All this activity takes place inside what Kuhn describes (somewhat inconsistently) as a "paradigm" - a "particular coherent tradition of scientific research". The paradigm governs not only the theory but the education, instrumentation, rules and standards of scientific practice, and is the basis on which the scientific community decides which kinds of questions are and are not relevant to the development of scientific research. A paradigm claims exclusivity over the adjudication of its own subject matter, and one only has authority to pronounce on a scientific problem once one has been fully inducted: evolutionary biologists will not take seriously the biological assertions of fundamentalist Christians, for example. Fundamentalist Christians who take biology exams will fail, and thereby will never be able to authoritatively comment on biological matters.
Paradigms are generally a useful thing for the jobbing scientist, since to her they provide a pre-agreed framework - what Dan Dennett would describe as a "crane" - on which additional scientific research can be undertaken without having, literally, to re-invent the wheel. Kuhn characterises this sort of "normal scientist" as being involved in "puzzle solving" in exactly the sense that one solves a crossword puzzle. You have a framework of rules for how to solve the puzzle; you have problems (the blank spaces on the puzzle) and you empirically obtained evidence (clues) which you manipulate using the rules to produce predictions (or answers), and each newly discovered answer then acts as an additional clue to solve the remaining problems.
Superficially, this all sounds fine, but there are brutal, jagged corals just below the water's surface: Once inside a paradigm it informs your view of the world so thoroughly it is not possible to conduct research outside it. To solve a crossword puzzle, there must first be *some* pre-determined rules of engagement (the same puzzle can be solved, differently, with different sets of rules: a "cryptic" crossword yields different answers for the same boxes, and perhaps even the same clues, to a "quick" crossword. But to solve it one needs to use one or the other). Unlike a crossword, Mother Nature doesn't come with a label saying "cryptic" or "quick". So how do we know which paradigm to use? Can the truth or falsity of the paradigm to be judged, other than in terms of the paradigm itself?
Kuhn says no. This is an immensely powerful idea. Not only does it undermine the certitude many people have about their own ways of life, it seems to opens the door to all the whacky alternatives, with no objective means of choosing between them. So can we really not choose between Radiotherapy and Healing Crystals?
That this might be the case terrifies a lot of people, especially scientists, and Kuhn gets a lot of the blame for this state of unease. Post-Modernism: It's all Kuhn's fault.
But this is surely to shoot the messenger: Kuhn's great contribution is not to say that healing crystals are in (he says nothing of the sort) but to say that the sacred and immutable link between science and truth is out, and we owe it to ourselves to keep an open mind about whatever we believe. After all, the history of science (which is what Kuhn started out writing about) is a long history of frequent revolution. Either all the theories scientists have ever believed up to the current day are baloney, always were, never really counted as science and we're just lucky to be around when the human race has finally got it right - which, to put it mildly, is wishful thinking - or the revolutionary history of science, which no-one disputes, tends to back up what Kuhn is saying.
Science does evolve, through the great algorithm of human discourse, and the dominating theories through time will tend to be the ones which most of us are persuaded work the best for us (whether we're right or not is really beside the point). What persuades in Tehran may differ from what persuades in Texas. All Thomas Kuhn cautions against is either side taking its own position as a given.
His enterprise is therefore fundamentally democratic - placing epistemological legitimacy in the hands of the entire community, as contingent and random as it may be from time to time, and not a self-selecting, self perpetuating elite.
One thing economic theory tells us is that concentrating economic control in a small part of the population (as in a monopoly) generally works out worse for everyone except the monopolist. There's no reason to suppose that concentrating intellectual authority should be any different.
In the Western Hemisphere - outside the Grateful Dead tour circuit, at any rate - intellectual authority mostly resides with established science, but it has to work - literally - to earn our respect.
The anti-Kuhn brigade like Richard Dawkins may not like that sort of accountability but, not being a scientist, I do.
Olly Buxton
a historically dense version of Jacob Bronowski; November 18, 2006
2 out of 2 found this comment useful.
Thomas Kuhn points out a lot of the sociology of how new scientific theories are accepted, and along the way 'derives' much of the remarkableness of the scientific process; people are forever saying how dry and mechanical science is, but they are ignorant and scared little you know whats more than anything else; trully, anybody who doesn't know the adventure and beauties that science reveals is mentally and emotionally sick; things like how Newtonian Mechanics is both right and wrong and every scientific theory is right and wrong which indicates research directions; when General Relativity and Quantum Mechanics corrected the problems of Newtonian Mechanics, they didn't just throw away Newtonian Mechanics, they 'generalized' and/or ate it up in the way they consumed/derived newtonian mechanics from a new higher perspective; Thomas Kuhn argues that Newtonian Mechanics cannot be derived from General Relativity, but I found his arguement unconvincing and shortsided(I forgot how/why/what; it has been awhile since I read the book, but I just reread my notes on the book last night and decided to right a review!).
I'll save some of the other remarkable things Kuhn found along the way of his historical research of science and point out one major omission that limits his seeing science in the proper light - the relation of mathematics and science. This is the major reason the book falls short in understanding the fundamental nature of science; that science/mathematics is a constructive analogy as Jacob Bronowski puts it; that science/mathematics is a unification(the derivation of newtonican mechanics from General Relativity, and chemistry from quantum mechanics are the classic scientific proofs of this effect of science), and the understanding of how that creative 'unification' of concepts solves problems works in science/mathematics.
I of course recommend reading Jacob Bronowski - particularly his "Origins of Knowledge and Imagination" above most of his other stuff. His "Ascent of Man" is more to be read for fun after knowing what he says in 'Origins.' "Ascent of Man" is just so general that if you don't know about the nature of science he teaches in his other books, then you'd read right past so much in "Ascent of Man." And, his 'Origins' book is the culmination and greatest synthesis of his insights; it is the culmination of twentieth century thought that Godel's theorem and the revolutions of science put on mankind in the twentieth century. It is the best science book outside of a good historical perspective development of a scientific theory type book like "Project Physics Course", or David Hilbert's "Geometry and the Imagination", or Morris Kline's, "Calculus."
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